Posted: Sat Feb 13, 2010 9:41 am Post subject: Afghan War is Obama's Viet nam
Afghan War nears end with Pakistan, Taliban victor
see page 3
Obama's NEW RULES of ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
Posted further down page. These FAVOR the ENEMY! They are INSANE!
Afghanistan Operation Moshtarak
13 February 2010
1. No night or surprise searches.
2. Villagers have to be warned prior to searches.
3. ANA or ANP must accompany U.S. units on searches.
4. U.S. soldiers may not fire at the enemy unless the enemy is preparing to fire first.
5. U.S. forces cannot engage the enemy if civilians are present.
6. Only women can search women.
7. Troops can fire at an insurgent if they catch him placing an IED but not if insurgents are walking away from an area where explosives have been laid.
----------------
Suicide bomber hits Nato convoy west of Kandahar
3 American service members have been killed by a bomb in southern Afghanistan
Operation Moshtarak - combined forces are serving alongside one another.
15,000 Afghan, U.S. Marines and intl troops from the US, UK, Canada and Afghanistan push into Helmand province of Afghanistan.
NATO troops enter Marjah where Taliban had set up a shadow government. As 200 U.S. Marines moved to increase
foothold in Marjah, Taliban fired guns and rocket-propelled grenades at them. In another part of town, soldiers were
in a fierce gunbattle. 5 Taliban were killed and 8 arrested. Taliban are still holding out in Marjah.
Posted: Tue Feb 16, 2010 5:55 am Post subject: BATTLEFIELD MIRACLE
BATTLEFIELD MIRACLE
U.S. Marine Walks Away
February 16, 2010
Lance Cpl. Andrew Koenig was shot in the head, the bullet bounced off him,
in one of those rare battlefield miracles. A Taliban sniper hit Koenig dead on in the front of his helmet,
and he walked away from it with a smile on his face. The company had landed by helicopter in the predawn dark.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,586083,00.html
Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2010 5:19 am Post subject: Taliban Cowards Using Human Shields
Taliban Cowards Using Human Shields
February 17, 2010
Taliban ordering women and children to stand on roofs and in windows as NATO forces carry out painstaking house-to-house searches.
This is typical dirty fighting of Islamic cowards everywhere, hiding behind civilians.
0bama has ordered U.S. troops not to fire at the terrorists with civilians nearby.
Consequently, 0bama is killing many of our troops needlessly. I am sure 0bama wants them all killed.
YOU CANT WIN a politicly correct war!
U.S. Marines found the Taliban cowards using civilians as human shields as military squads resumed house-to-house searches.
Taliban firing at troops from inside or next to compounds where women and children were ordered to stand on a roof or in a window.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,586263,00.html
Marines call in gunships
US Marines battling the Taliban in southern Afghanistan have had to call in helicopter gunships for support, as a major offensive enters its fifth day.
They face sustained machine-gun fire from Talibans hiding in bunkers.
British forces discovered a cache of stolen Afghan army and police uniforms, suggesting the Taliban were planning disguise attacks.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8519507.stm
Posted: Thu Feb 18, 2010 9:38 am Post subject: RULES of ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
RULES of ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
These WILL NOT WORK. These ROE only help the enemy.
The REAL ENEMY is IN THE WHITEHOUSE!
Strict war rules slow Afghan offensive
Feb 15, 2010 yahoo news
MARJAH, Afghanistan – Some American and Afghan troops say they're fighting the latest offensive in Afghanistan with a handicap — strict rules that routinely force them to hold their fire.
Although details of the new guidelines are classified to keep insurgents from reading them, U.S. troops say the Taliban are keenly aware of the restrictions.
"I understand the reason behind it, but it's so hard to fight a war like this," said Lance Cpl. Travis Anderson, 20, of Altoona, Iowa. "They're using our rules of engagement against us," he said, adding that his platoon had repeatedly seen men drop their guns into ditches and walk away to blend in with civilians.
If a man emerges from a Taliban hideout after shooting erupts, U.S. troops say they cannot fire at him if he is not seen carrying a weapon — or if they did not personally watch him drop one.
What this means, some contend, is that a militant can fire at them, then set aside his weapon and walk freely out of a compound, possibly toward a weapons cache in another location. It was unclear how often this has happened. In another example, Marines pinned down by a barrage of insurgent bullets say they can't count on quick air support because it takes time to positively identify shooters.
"This is difficult," Lance Cpl. Michael Andrejczuk, 20, of Knoxville, Tenn., said Monday. "We are trained like when we see something, we obliterate it. But here, we have to see them and when we do, they don't have guns."
NATO and Afghan military officials say killing militants is not the goal of a 3-day-old attack to take control of this Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan. More important is to win public support.
They acknowledge that the rules entail risk to its troops, but maintain that civilian casualties or destruction of property can alienate the population and lead to more insurgent recruits, more homemade bombs and a prolonged conflict.
But troops complain that strict rules of engagement — imposed to spare civilian casualties — are slowing their advance into the town of Marjah in Helmand province, the focal point of the operation involving 15,000 troops.
"The problem is isolating where the enemy is," said Capt. Joshua Winfrey, a Marine company commander from Stillwater, Oklahoma. "We are not going to drop ordnance out in the open."
That's a marked change from the battle of Fallujah, Iraq in November 2004. When Marines there encountered snipers holed up in a building, they routinely called in airstrikes. In Marjah, fighter jets are flying at low altitude in a show of force, but are not firing missiles.
Politically, it's not the best time to campaign for relaxing the rules in Afghanistan. On Sunday, two U.S. rockets struck a house and killed 12 Afghan civilians during the offensive in Marjah, NATO said. On Monday, a NATO airstrike accidentally killed five civilians and wounded two in neighboring Kandahar province.
It was public outrage in Afghanistan over civilian deaths that prompted the top NATO commander, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, last year to tighten the rules, including the use of airstrikes and other weaponry if civilians are at risk.
Afghan civilian deaths soared to 2,412 civilians last year — the highest number in any year of the 8-year-old war, according to a U.N. report. But the deaths attributed to allied troops dropped nearly 30 percent as a result of McChrystal's new rules, according to the report.
Under the current rules of engagement, troops retain the right to use lethal force in self defense, said U.S. Col. Wayne Shanks, a spokesman for the international force.
The rules seek to put the troops in the "right frame of mind to exercise that right," Shanks said. They require troops to ask a few fundamental questions:
• Even if someone has shot in my general direction, am I still in danger?
• Will I make more enemies than I'll kill by destroying property, or harming innocent civilians?
• What are my other options to resolve this without escalating the violence?
On Monday, Marines in the northern part of Marjah followed the rules of engagement, but a civilian still ended up dead.
As troops fought teams of insurgent snipers throughout the day in heavy gunfights, a young Afghan man ran toward the Marines. More than once, the troops warned him to stop, but he kept running.
Following the rules, the Marines uttered a verbal warning, and fired a flare and a warning shot overhead. Still the man didn't stop. Marines shot him dead.
Afterward, Marine officers said the victim appeared to be a mentally ill man who had panicked during the gun battle.
"Sadly, everything was done right," said Lt. Col. Brian Christmas, commander of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. "The family understood."
Christmas said his troops might be frustrated, but understand the reasons behind the strict rules. As he spoke, Cobra attack helicopters fired Hellfire missiles nearby. Ground forces under intense fire had requested the air support 90 minutes earlier, but it took that long to positively identify the militants who were shooting at the allied forces.
"We didn't come to Marjah to destroy it, or to hurt civilians," Christmas said.
That message was drilled into the troops in the run-up to the offensive.
"What are we here for?" Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, the top Marine commander in Afghanistan, would shout to his troops.
"The people!" was the troops' refrain.
Afghan forces cite examples of the restrictions too.
Col. Shrin Shah Kohbandi, commander of the new Afghan army corps in Helmand province, told reporters that his troops saw militants running away from the battlefield toward a village in Nad Ali district where they disappeared among villagers. "They hid their weapons so they became `civilians,'" under the rules, he said. "We didn't kill them and we weren't able to arrest them."
Khan Mohammad Khan, a former Afghan Army commander in neighboring Kandahar province, said being able to use heavy weapons and conduct air strikes only in selective situations has hamstrung troops in Marjah.
But Brig. Gen. Sher Mohammad Zazai, commander of Afghan army troops in the south, said there is no plan to revise the rules.
"The aim of the operation is not to kill militants," he said. "The aim is to protect civilians and bring in development."
Posted: Thu Feb 18, 2010 9:41 am Post subject: Obama's NEW RULES of ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
Obama's NEW RULES of ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
These WILL NOT WORK. These ROE only help the enemy.
The REAL ENEMY is IN THE WHITEHOUSE!
Current U.S. Rules Of Engagement In Afghanistan Problematic
December 17, 2009
The response to president Obama's much delayed announcement regarding increased troop levels in Afghanistan has been predictable, with opinion divided predominantly along ideological lines and less concern devoted to matters of military necessity.
Generally, the left hates the idea of committing as many as 30,000 additional troops to the Afghan theater by next summer with many on the political right, though basically supportive of the mission, in large part demanding the full complement of 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal had originally requested [that number did not represent the upward limit of the General's most ambitious plan which took form in a much larger surge, comprised of possibly 85,000 troops].
But warfare is more than a game of numbers, depending on many less quantifiable and sometimes more important factors.
Among those which are deservedly receiving much greater prominence now is the matter of the critical guidance issued to U.S. forces that serves to define what constitutes the appropriate use of force when engaging the enemy - the Rules of Engagement [ROE].
The issue comes under scrutiny now that the decision has been made to substantially increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, but with the daunting caveat that they will only be allotted about a year to prove their effectiveness before the withdrawal process is set in motion, in July of 2011, not surprisingly in consideration of the 2012 presidential election.
The exact content of U.S. Rules of Engagement are necessarily classified, but can be stitched together and approximated with a reasonable degree of accuracy from various sources, media and otherwise. The most trustworthy of these come from statements - seldom for attribution - made by active U.S. combat forces and returning vets.
The military itself will comment, with a certain sense of vagueness, about the general outlines of the ROE, but will not address specific elements of the directive.
To those who believe that the West is embroiled in an epic conflict between civilization and Islamic jihad, the ROE loom large. If the rules are overly restrictive, U.S. combat efficiency will be negatively affected and American casualties will quickly rise. On the other hand if the ROE are too wide open then they might well serve to quash popular support for the mission among the Afghani people, a matter of prime concern in counterinsurgency warfare.
There are two official military documents which provide relevant guidance on the use of lethal force.
1. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance
2. Unclassified July 2, 2009 guidance regarding the Tactical Directive [ROE]
At the beginning of December, PipeLineNews.org opened a line of communication with a senior ISAF spokesman in Afghanistan in order to more fully understand the ROE. What follows in this section is a verbatim transcript, our questions appear in bold. The response begins with a general statement of policy; we made the decision not to attribute the comments to a particular individual, though that was not part of the ground rules going into this process.
"In general, our troops retain the right to use lethal force in self-defense. COMISAF's [Editor's note: Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force] tactical directive is mostly about putting our forces in the right frame of mind to exercise that right. So, for example, in the past if a group of insurgents fired on soldiers and then retreated into a compound or mosque, the "troops in contact" situation might not end until we waited them out or, if we'd taken reasonable but not foolproof steps to ensure civilians weren't present, dropped a bomb or artillery round on the building.
The tactical directive requires troops, to the best of their ability, to ask a few fundamental questions in that situation. Even if someone might be shooting in my general direction, am I still in danger? Will I make more enemies than I'll kill by destroying property or, if I've missed something, innocent civilians?
What are my other options to resolve this without escalating the violence? As unfortunate as they were, the incidents that have become emblems of perceived problems with the tactical directive were not situations in which the decisions discussed in the tactical directive ever came into play."
What is the current directive regarding ROE in Afghanistan?
"All forces operating under the authority of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan are subject to Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued by Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum. The ROE are consistent with NATO publication MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement. Non-ISAF US forces operate under similar ROE promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. US ROE are based on CJCSI 3121.01A. All US units, ISAF and non-ISAF, retain the inherent right of self defense. The ROE are classified and their content cannot be released to or discussed with members of the public."
Would you please describe the process under which this policy was determined, by whom the final policy was set and how long it has been in effect?
"As stated in response to the first question, the ISAF ROE has been issued by Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum consistent with NATO publication MC 362/1. The content of the ROE is influenced by a variety of factors. ROE must be lawful, and international law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during military operations. The ROE have been in effect since NATO assumed the lead for ISAF in August 2003 and the current ROE were issued in May 2006, but are under constant review.
US ROE is also under constant review by commanders at all levels of command. The Secretary of Defense, with input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chain of command, determines the ROE applicable to all US units. General McChrystal has recently issued a tactical directive designed to reduce civilian casualties while maintaining the inherent right of self defense for all units. While the tactical directive, like all orders is always subject to review, there are currently no plans to alter it."
To what degree, if any, was the civilian government in Afghanistan a party to ROE being set?
"ISAF operates in Afghanistan at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The ROE is an ISAF military document applicable only to ISAF forces, but it is consistent with ISAF's mandate and the Afghan Government's request that ISAF support it in meeting its responsibilities to provide security, stability and development. US ROE are contained in a classified military document. Although Commanders consider the concerns of the Afghan Government, the Afghan Government plays no direct role in development of the ROE."
Are there plans to modify the current ROE to possibly be more consistent with the Afghan surge?
"ROE are constantly reviewed and, if appropriate, amended, to ensure that they provide ISAF and US forces with the ability to carry out its mandate and support the Afghan Government in meeting its responsibilities to provide security, stability and development."
Under what circumstances are battlefield captures/detainees 'Mirandized'?
"'Mirandize' is a US term about notification of a person's rights under law upon arrest by a US law enforcement officer. It is not a term that is applicable to the detention of a person in Afghanistan by ISAF forces. Law enforcement, such as arrest for a criminal offence, is the function of the Government of Afghanistan. However, persons detained by ISAF forces are advised as soon as circumstances permit of the grounds upon which they are detained and may make representations to the detaining authority about their detention. US Service-members do not Mirandize personnel captured or detained. Detention by US service-members is conducted under the Law of Armed Conflict and not under criminal law and thus Miranda is not applicable. Detainees questioned by US law enforcement personnel for possible prosecution in US Court's may Mirandize the detainees where appropriate."
Under current policy, at what point does custodial interrogation begin for battlefield captures/detainees?
"The questioning of individuals detained by ISAF forces is undertaken in accordance with ISAF and national rules and policy and complies with obligations under international law. As stated above detention by US service-members is conducted under the Law of Armed Conflict and not under criminal law and thus Miranda is not applicable. US law enforcement personnel would determine if Miranda warnings are required prior to any interview they conduct."
It's difficult to read through the above guidance and not get the sense that an extraordinary degree of judgment and hence restraint is being required of the U.S. military in the Afghan theater, to a degree seldom if ever seen in warfare.
A few enterprising U.S. media sources [in this case, an article published November 16, 2009 in the Washington Times] have expended much effort to piece together specific components of the ROE [source, U.S. troops battle both Taliban and their own rules]
"1. No night or surprise searches.
2. Villagers have to be warned prior to searches.
3. ANA or ANP must accompany U.S. units on searches.
4. U.S. soldiers may not fire at the enemy unless the enemy is preparing to fire first.
5. U.S. forces cannot engage the enemy if civilians are present.
6. Only women can search women.
7. Troops can fire at an insurgent if they catch him placing an IED but not if insurgents are walking away from an area where explosives have been laid."
In a recent interview carried on NPR [seldom characterized as a pro-war media source] Rules Of Engagement Are A Dilemma For U.S. Troops one of the interviewees, Tom Bowman, relates his first-hand experience during a trip to Afghanistan, where he observed a detachment of Marines which was forced by the ROE to break off engaging a group of insurgents who were caught dead to rights placing a roadside IED.
"...we were inside this center, a command center, watching a video screen. They were watching live while these guys were digging a hole for a roadside bomb. And there were other indicators, too, besides digging the hole. There was a guy swimming across a canal with this wire, and the wires are used to detonate the bomb... They had all the indicators that these guys were insurgents planting a bomb. So they thought about using a machine gun to shoot these guys. There was another combat outpost not too far away. The problem was there was a compound of houses between where the Marines were with their machine gun and the guys planting the bomb. So then they decided to bring in the helicopters and use the machines guns and the helicopters to shoot these guys. As the helicopters came in, these guys look up in the air and start walking away. One of the guys was carrying a yellow jug - and that's become the icon of the roadside bomb. They mix fertilizer and diesel fuel in this, and that becomes a part of the bomb. And then we saw one of these guys throw this jug into a haystack."
The anecdote ends with the gunship showing up and the insurgents responding by simply walking away unscathed, because the Marines no longer had the authority to engage the now "harmless" enemy.
We have noted similar occurrences in our previous coverage, for example this September 29 piece Obama's Afghan Rules Of Engagement Prove He Has No Interest In Winning
"...When it gets to the point that even Afghan tribal leaders start demanding that U.S. and NATO ground forces take off the silk gloves and start killing more Taliban fighters, something must indeed be wrong with the way our rules of engagement hamper battlefield operations. The tribal leader referred to above was quoted in a Washington Post article as countenancing more of the type of airstrikes which took place in Khunduz province on September 4 which along with killing significant numbers of the enemy also unfortunately resulted in civilian casualties. Rather than decrying the incident, Ahmadullah Wardak, the provincial council chairman confronted U.S. theater commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, bitterly protesting the reticence of U.S. forces to engage the enemy under Obama's new rules of engagement, 'If we do three more operations like was done the other night, stability will come to Kunduz...If people do not want to live in peace and harmony, that's not our fault...We've been too nice to the thugs.'" [source, Washington Post, Sole Informant Guided Decision On Afghan Strike]
Such incidents are unfortunately not isolated.
In a statement made during a national security briefing, sponsored by Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, by Lt. Col. Allen West [Retired, having served 2 1/2 years in Afghanistan at Kandahar Air Base as Sr. Advisor to the Afghan Army] he said, "The Rules of Engagement have been so terribly drawn up now that we are allowing the enemy to pin down our forces...before we will engage with all available weapon systems. The Taliban knows what we will and will not do. I'll give you a great example. You go outside the gate of Kandahar Air Base and you will have people that are sitting right outside the gate, that are watching convoys, that are counting, but you can't engage them because they don't have weapons and therefore they're not conveying any hostile intent..." [Col West's statement begins about 7:50 into the video]
Other examples abound. One involves American units coming under attack, taking small arms fire from enemy forces which are operating near a village. In previous wars one of the main options would be to call in close air support and resolve the matter with finality, however in this conflict special legal clearance [which sometimes fail to materialize, despite the justifiability of the proposed action] must often be obtained before acting.
As noted early in this piece, one of the key notions in U.S. counterinsurgency theory is that though the enemy can be militarily defeated, the conflict can nonetheless still be lost through inappropriate application of force which results in enough collateral [civilian] casualties to turn the populace against the effort, rendering liberators into occupiers in their minds.
This concern was made clear by our military source in a follow up note:
"...We can't win this battle by bombing or shooting everything. Our leaders must make hard choices on employment of their troops and weapons in order to accomplish their mission. Protecting the Afghan people is one of our top priorities - we cannot win this battle without them. Preventing civilian casualties is a fabric which runs through all our operations..."
It seems clear that in Afghanistan some primary elements of the ROE must be viewed as being largely discordant with traditional war-fighting doctrine, making guidance subservient to political considerations which may or may not be wise, yielding a military strategy of yet undetermined effectiveness.
One effect the current ROE has is to make all concerned overly cautious, cognizant of potential legal complications. When everyone from the commander on the ground to the command center on up to the Sec. of Defense and CIC becomes risk averse to an extreme degree, the real possibility of insufficient application of force becomes compounded exponentially, the higher the decision making process goes, if only because of increasing estrangement from the battlefield.
The enemy undoubtedly has a very good understanding of our rules of engagement, after all they are the ones being targeted, and they routinely take advantage of them. The ease with which they game the system gives pause for concern that the ROE place questionable constraints on the use of lethal force by our troops.
It's not breaking news that the Afghanis have now been at war continuously for 30 years and no one in that unfortunate country has any misconceptions regarding the brutality of warfare. Those in political authority, at least those at the local level who are not particularly allied with the enemy ideologically [questions of Islamic brotherhood and political hedging aside] want this conflict to end, resolved with a defeated Taliban.
The goal of these players, many of them local chieftains and tribal leaders then intersects with the United States' major foreign policy objective which is to establish a mechanism in Afghanistan whereby the country can best avoid backsliding into its previous role as a base for Islamic jihad directed against the U.S. interests and the West in general.
The only way to do this is to defeat the Taliban, something unquestionably within our military power.
Failing to do so in the most effective manner invokes an event horizon fraught with unacceptable risk:
One, if the Afghans get the sense that we are not serious about this matter, that we are so concerned with world opinion and its media drivers that we are not fully committed to defeating the jihadis, then they will necessarily hold back and not burn bridges with the Taliban and their sponsors.
Who could blame them?
Two, if the American public [increasingly restive about the Afghan operation, though in our opinion that is by no means a hardened position] is once again bombarded with daily body counts appearing above the fold on the front page of the New York Times et al., as U.S. troops suffer unneeded casualties while the war turns increasingly hot next spring and summer, then there will be considerable pressure, perhaps irresistible, given president Obama's apparent lack of genuine commitment to U.S. force projection anywhere, to end the conflict and leave the Afghans to the tender mercies of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the terrorist network.
Three, though American troops have already proven themselves, beyond measure, as unfailingly courageous and effective, we can't expect them to maintain the requisite level of morale forever in the face of overly restrictive ROE and waning political support.
For these reasons an urgent, immediate and thorough review of the ROE in Afghanistan is called for. This assessment should be done outside the extant "constant review" process referred to in the ISAF spokesman's statement. Attention must be directed to deemphasizing concern over what really amounts to public relations, crafted to assuage players who will never support the mission and don't like us in the first place, and instead move with all deliberate haste to assure maximization of American force effectiveness by optimizing the ROE. The key here must be to decisively defeat the Taliban and whatever remnants of al-Qaeda which might still be present and minimizing [while accepting the inevitability of] U.S. military and civilian Afghan casualties. As part of this process we must not ignore the opinions of those in positions of natural influence at the most elemental level in Afghan society, the tribal elders and imams [mirroring what was done in the successful Iraq surge] who eventually and understandably want us out, but on terms which can still be largely consistent with our legitimate foreign policy goals in the region.
We realize that our military leaders have been presented with a supreme challenge in this matter, fighting a barbaric, totally committed and clever enemy in such a way as to navigate around the numerous obstacles, many of our own construction, placed along the way.
We remain confident that if reasonableness prevails, something not entirely in evidence at this point, then we will achieve our goals and avoid fighting a pretend war which does disservice to this country our troops and the Afghan people.
Posted: Sat Feb 20, 2010 7:41 am Post subject: 8 Americans Die in Afghanistan
8 Americans Die in Afghanistan
February 20, 2010
12 NATO service members, including 8 Americans*, have died in the first week of the offensive in Marja.
* There are brave heroes dying uncounted in foreign wars. Many military are suffering in many ways once they return home.
Most suffer a lonliness of soul the rest of us cannot understand. A part of them dies on the battlefield. Remember them all in your prayers.
The Dutch government collapsed over disagreements on extending troop deployments in Afghanistan.
Christian Democratic PM Balkenende said the Labour Party was quitting the government.
He had been considering a NATO request for Dutch forces to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2010.
But Labour opposed the move.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8525742.stm
Posted: Thu Feb 25, 2010 6:20 am Post subject: Afghanistan’s Marjah handed over to civilian authorities
Feb 25, 2010
1,000 U.S. soldiers killed in Afghanistan
Afghan wounded tell of those left in Marjah
Distinguishing between civilian and Taliban casualties is especially difficult
Taxis turned into ambulances ferry wounded civilians out of the combat zone in southern Afghanistan,
but one man's long trip to a hospital began with a two-hour wheelbarrow ride.
Mohammad's legs were peppered with shrapnel when a bomb exploded nearby.
His brother found him unconscious and lifted him into the only thing he could find, pushing him in the wheelbarrow before he flagged a taxi.
Mohammad, who is from the Nad Ali district around Marjah, is one of 40 civilians treated at Emergency Hospital in
Lashkar Gah since the Afghan-NATO offensive in Marjah began on Feb. 13. Both of his legs were in casts. Steel pins protruded from his right leg.
The IED menace is constant.
The Taliban hide crude bombs in culverts, doorways, walls, wherever they think Western troops will pass.
Sometimes, soldiers clear an area, and terrorists go back and plant another bomb.
Just about every U.S. soldier operating in support of a Marine offensive in the southern Afghan town of Marjah
knows someone who was hit by an IED, often in a Stryker infantry vehicle.
That someone got lucky, or was wounded, or died.
A lot of soldiers were blown up themselves, recovered and went back to their unit.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35564...world_news-south_and_central_asia
Afghanistan’s Marjah handed over to civilian authorities after huge operation. Afghan and international forces have
handed over control of the southern Afghanistan town of Marjah to civilian authorities, however, Taliban fighters are still active.
Posted: Fri Feb 26, 2010 6:04 pm Post subject: US plans to oust Taliban from Kandahar
US plans to oust Taliban from Kandahar
Feb 26, 2010
The US has said it is planning a new offensive later this year to drive the Taliban from the southern Afghanistan city of Kandahar.
The current action against the Taliban stronghold of Marjah was a "prelude" to a bigger operation, a US official said.
The US general in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan has said the local population in Kandahar is at risk.
Kandahar is Afghanistan's second largest city, and was once a Taliban stronghold.
'Reversing momentum'
A major offensive there would follow the current military operation in neighbouring Helmand province.
"If the goal in Afghanistan is to reverse the momentum of the Taliban... then we think we have to get to Kandahar this year," an official in the White House told reporters.
The US goal was to bring "comprehensive population security" to the city.
Suicide attacks are frequently carried out in Kandahar, with one at the beginning on February killing three people.
He described Marjah as "a tactical prelude to a comprehensive operation in Kandahar City."
The Marjah offensive by Nato forces began in mid-February, and has several more weeks to go.
It was "pretty much on track", the official said.
Kabul attack
In Kabul on Friday, explosions and shooting took place in an area of hotels and guesthouses popular with foreigners. Up to nine Indians, a Frenchman and an Italian were killed.
Three gunmen and two policemen died in a gun battle that lasted several hours. Taliban militants said they had carried it out.
President Hamid Karzai condemned the violence. India called it "barbaric".
Kabul has been relatively quiet since 18 January, when Taliban bombers and gunmen attacked government targets and shopping malls, killing 12 people.
Friday's attack is also the Taliban's first major raid since the arrest of key leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Pakistan this month.
Posted: Sun Mar 07, 2010 11:03 am Post subject: 50 Killed in Battle in Afghanistan
50 Killed as Taliban, Rival Militants Battle in Afghanistan
March 07, 2010
KABUL — Gunbattles between the Taliban and another Islamist faction have killed at least 50 people in northeastern Afghanistan, officials said Sunday. The militants are apparently fighting for control of several villages where the central government has almost no presence.
The fighting was continuing Sunday, with militants using heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, the governor of Baghlan province said.
Local police official Zalmai Mangal said the fighting in the northeastern province appears to be a power struggle between local Taliban forces and the Hezb-e-Islami militia loyal to warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Violent clashes between anti-government Islamist factions are rare, although various militias have their own agendas and power struggles are relatively common.
Mangal, the province's deputy police chief, said reports from the area indicate that at least 50 militant fighters were dead, 35 from Hezb-e-Islami and 15 from the Taliban. He spoke by telephone from a district near the fighting where government forces have rushed to observe and try to help any wounded civilians.
It was unclear what touched off the fighting, which erupted Saturday morning and continued late into the night, resuming Sunday, Mangal said. However, he said that Taliban fighters reportedly had moved into villages that traditionally were controlled by Hezb-e-Islami.
Provincial Gov. Mohammad Akbar Barakzai also said that 50 militants were reported killed, though he did not have a breakdown of the casualties.
The fighting centered around five to six villages west of Baghlan-e-Jadid district in the central part of the province, Barakzai said.
"We don't know yet about casualties among civilians or damage to civilian houses," he said.
Posted: Sun Mar 28, 2010 6:37 am Post subject: US troop deaths double in Afghanistan
US troop deaths double in Afghanistan
March 27, 2010
KABUL (AP) - The number of U.S. troops killed in Afghanistan has roughly doubled in the first three months of 2010 compared to the same period last year as Washington has added tens of thousands of additional soldiers to reverse the Taliban's momentum.
Those deaths have been accompanied by a dramatic spike in the number of wounded, with injuries more than tripling in the first two months of the year and trending in the same direction based on the latest available data for March.
U.S. officials have warned that casualties are likely to rise even further as the Pentagon completes its deployment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and sets its sights on the Taliban's home base of Kandahar province, where a major operation is expected in the coming months.
"We must steel ourselves, no matter how successful we are on any given day, for harder days yet to come," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a briefing last month.
In total, 57 U.S. troops were killed here during the first two months of 2010 compared with 28 in January and February of last year, an increase of more than 100 percent, according to Pentagon figures compiled by The Associated Press. At least 20 American service members have been killed so far in March, an average of about 0.8 per day, compared to 13, or 0.4 per day, a year ago.
The steady rise in combat deaths has generated less public reaction in the United States than the spike in casualties last summer and fall, which undermined public support in the U.S. for the 8-year-old American-led mission here. Fighting traditionally tapers off in Afghanistan during winter months, only to peak in the summer.
After a summer marked by the highest monthly death rates of the war, President Barack Obama faced serious domestic opposition over his decision in December to increase troops in Afghanistan, with only about half the American people supporting the move. But support for his handling of the war has actually improved since then, despite the increased casualties.
The latest Associated Press-GfK poll at the beginning of March found that 57 percent of those surveyed approved his handling of the war in Afghanistan compared to 49 percent two months earlier. The poll surveyed 1,002 adults nationwide and had a margin of error of plus or minus 4.2 percentage points.
Michael O'Hanlon, a foreign policy expert at the Brookings Institution, said the poll results could partly be a reaction to last month's offensive against the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in Helmand province, which the Obama administration painted as the first test of its revamped counterinsurgency strategy.
Some 10,000 U.S., NATO and Afghan forces seized control of the farming community of about 80,000 people while suffering relatively few deaths. But the Taliban continue to plant bombs at night and intimidate the locals, and the hardest part of the operation is yet to come: building an effective local government that can win over the loyalty of the people.
"My main thesis ... is that Americans can brace themselves for casualties in war if they consider the stakes high enough and the strategy being followed promising enough," O'Hanlon said. "But such progress in public opinion is perishable, if not right away then over a period of months, if we don't sustain the new momentum."
A rise in the number of wounded - a figure that draws less attention than deaths - shows that the Taliban remain a formidable opponent.
The number of U.S. troops wounded in Afghanistan and three smaller theaters where there isn't much battlefield activity rose from 85 in the first two months of 2009 to 381 this year, an increase of almost 350 percent. A total of 50 U.S. troops were wounded last March, an average of 1.6 per day. In comparison, 44 were injured during just the first six days of March this year, an average of 7.3 per day.
The increase in casualties was partly driven by the higher number of troops in Afghanistan in 2010. American troops rose from 32,000 at the beginning of last year to 68,000 at the end of the year, an increase of more than 110 percent.
"We've got a massive influx of troops, we have troops going into areas where they have not previously been and you have a reaction by an enemy to a new force presence," said NATO spokesman Lt. Col. Todd Breasseale.
The troop numbers have continued to rise in 2010 in line with the recent surge. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday that a third of the additional forces, or 10,000 troops, are already in Afghanistan. They plan to have all 30,000 troops in the country before the end of the year.
U.S. officials have said they plan to use many of the additional forces to reassert control in Kandahar province, where the insurgents have slowly taken territory over the past few years in an effort to boost their influence over Kandahar city, the largest metropolis in the south and the Taliban's former capital.
Many analysts believe the Kandahar operation will be much more difficult than the recent Marjah offensive because of the greater dispersion of Taliban forces, the urban environment in Kandahar city and the complex political and tribal forces at work in the province.
The goal of both operations is to put enough pressure on the Taliban to force them to the negotiating table to work out a political settlement to end the war - a process the U.S. believes will only gain momentum once the militant group has lost traction on the battlefield.
"Until they transition to that mode, then we will have fighters ready to take shots at us and plant IEDs (improvised explosive devices)," said Lt. Col. Calvert Worth Jr., commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Regiment in central Marjah.
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